

**Political History Collection  
Interview H.0009.03 : Tape 3**

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**Location of Interview:** Lhasa, Tibet Autonomous Region, China  
**Date of Interview:** June 1992  
**Language of Interview:** Tibetan  
**Interviewed by:** Melvyn Goldstein and Tashi Tsering  
**Name:** Chape, Tseden Phüntso [Tib. chab spel, tshe bstan phun tshogs]  
**Gender:** Male  
**Age:** ca. 78  
**Date of Birth:** ca. 1921

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## **Abstract**

Chape [Tib. chab spel] was a Tibetan government lay official. In this interview, he discusses how Labrang set up schools on some of its estates. He also describes how one of the Labrang estate stewards disseminated a lot of propaganda on reforms, but that later the miser held struggle sessions against him during the reinvestigation (Tib. kyarshib [Tib. skyar zhib]) of the reforms campaign. He explains how the disputes between the Shung and Labrang were settled in Beijing and in Tibet, but how both sides were not satisfied in the end. He also discusses, in detail, how Mao Zedong sent Ya Hanzhang to Tibet to investigate the relative power of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, and how he finally indicated that the Dalai Lama was the main leader of Tibet and the Panchen Lama was the second.

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## **Tape 3**

**A:** From the beginning, the Panchen's Nangmagang was set up according to the Tibetan system. Later, Labrang changed it into the Nangang Uyön Lhengang. This was supposed to be revolutionary and the dzasa were also [now] called Truren [Ch. zhu ren]. Under the dzasa there were the Vice Truren. The [previous] rimshi were now called uyön. The Uyön Lhengang did some work to lower taxes and reduce old debts.

**Q:** Was this name changed after the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region [PCTAR] started in 1956?

**A:** No, it was before that. Probably it was around 1954-55-56. The Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region was also about to start. At this time, they didn't really do reforms but took some steps on that road to get closer to that. Tsöndrü Namgyel [Tib. brtson 'grus nam rgyal] and I talked about a trial reform on an estate, but I don't recall much, but I think the estate was the Lhen [Tib. lhan] Estate. It was on one of the bigger Labrang estates. At this time, the Panchen Nangmagang built some schools in some of the bigger dzong under Labrang and trained some teachers and sent them to these schools. The teacher at the Lhen estate was Chugra Tseden [Tib. phyug ra tshe brtan].

**Q:** Where is the Lhen estate located?

**A:** It's in the upper part of the Takdruka [Tib. stag gru kha] ferry site.

**Q:** Tashi Tsering: This must in the Jangthang area where the Yingon [Tib. dbying mgon] Monastery was, right?

**A:** Yes, there was an estate steward there whose name I don't quite recall. It was something like Rangjön Drangkhang [Tib. rang byon brang khang]. The main person who did the reforms was the teacher. He made a lot of propaganda for doing the reforms in 1958, and he mobilized the misers, saying that we don't have to wait, we should do the reforms now. There was an acting estate steward who didn't dare to stay there. I don't know if he fled or what. Anyways, something happened there.

**Q:** Tashi Tsering: Is Tseden alive now?

**A:** Probably not. He was from Shigatse. After that, when the reinvestigation of the reforms was done, they also held severe struggle sessions against him.

**Q:** Was this in 1960?

**A:** In Shigatse it was in 1961. First they did reforms in the local [Tibetan] government areas and then they did it in the Labrang area. There were the Three Oppositions and Two Exemptions and the Two oppositions and Two Exemptions. There was no anti revolt in the two oppositions. They did two oppositions in the places where they implemented the redeeming policy.

[The interviewee said earlier that when the real reform came they called this earlier reform a fake reform and there was a lot of confusion].

The three oppositions campaign was in the areas where the revolt took place. The non revolt areas were where they did the Two Oppositions and Two Exemptions. There were big differences between [what was done in] the revolt areas and non-revolt areas. In the non revolt areas there were no struggle sessions, no imprisonments and they did the redeeming policy. So all of Labrang's areas were under the Two Opposition and Two Exemptions policy.

**Q:** I heard that in 1960 the Panchen Lama sent a long report to government advising to postpone the People's Commune [Tib. mi dmangs Ch. gong shi]? What was that?

**A:** It was the 70,000 syllables report. I think it was in 1962. After the reforms were done, the Panchen Lama came to Tibet in about 1961. He came to investigate the work going on in Tibet and then he returned to China and then submitted the report.

**Q:** When did he come back?

**A:** Probably, in 1962.

**Q:** When the revolt took place was he in Shigatse?

**A:** Yes, as soon as the revolt started, the Panchen Lama went to China. Then after the revolt was over and the reforms were implemented, he returned to Shigatse and investigated what happened to the religion and those things. Then in 1962-63, he returned to China and produced the 70,000 syllables report which was like a suggestion [Tib. bsam 'char] [it was in Tibetan].

**Q:** Did he say in this that China shouldn't start the commune immediately?

**A:** No. I am not sure whether it was about the commune. The main thing was that at the time of doing the democratic reforms in Tibet, some work was not done well so these should be corrected.

**Q:** Tashi Tsering: So this was a criticism [Tib. skyon rjod], right?

**A:** Yes. For example, in the monasteries, monks who didn't know religion were appointed as leaders, so the monastery did not have the essence of a monastery and these had to be expelled. The poor monks were made into trurin and such positions, so he said, "They didn't have religious knowledge and they are doing reckless things just going through the motions of wearing the monk's robe. This kind of work will only lead to the death of the religion, so this has to be changed". Basically, he said that at the time of democratic reforms, there was the mistake of excessive leftism [Tib. g.yon thal] and this was wrong and should be corrected.

**Q:** Tashi Tsering: Are there any people still alive who helped the Panchen Lama writing this report? I heard that Dorje Gyalpo [Tib. rdo rje rgyal po] was there.

**A:** Probably he was there. This document was written in Beijing. But, I didn't hear that there was anybody among the Labrang officials whose writing was good, but it is not certain whether he had internally discussed it with them. The Panchen Lama signed the report with his own name.

**Q:** Tashi Tsering: That's why he was brought down [Tib. dbu nyes], right?

**A:** That occurred in 1964, and this was the main reason.

**Q:** Is this written up in a book?

**A:** No. Only a few people have seen this. Later, when they accused him of crimes, they talked about the 70,000 syllable report. At this time, in the Tibet Autonomous Region, they held a meeting and probably they didn't hold face-to face struggle sessions severely, though they did a little bit. They didn't do it large scale like calling the masses. But when they exposed his crime, they said that his report opposed the Communist Party.

**Q:** Is there anyone around who has seen this?

**A:** No.

**Q:** Can you tell me about the 1958 meeting in Shigatse held after Surkhang and Tan Guansan came back after meeting Nehru in Yadong and how Tan Guansan criticized the Tibetan Government and Surkhang rebuked it?

**A:** Yes. I was there.

**Q:** When was it held? Was it in the summer or winter?

**A:** I'm not sure. At the meeting, Tan Guansan said, "That China had no other plan than to peacefully liberate Tibet and we hope not to use military force. But the Tibetan Government has been outwardly complying but secretly violating [Tib. mngon brtsi lkog 'gal]. He criticized the government for it's behavior and he said some very pointed critiques pointed at Surkhang [although not by name]. He said, "There are some people among the main ones in charge of the government who act very tactfully [Tib. mkhas po]

when they come and after getting out from the door, they are doing the opposite. There are people like this. If they act like this later it will not be good. If they do disgusting action that draws blood from their brother nationality [Chinese], that will be bad. The Central Government has been very tolerant up to now, but there is a limit to its tolerance. If you continue to act like this, it will not be good" so like this he gave a powerful criticism. I don't remember it in detail.

**Q:** Tashi Tsering: I heard that he banged his fist on the table. Is that true?

**A:** Tan Guansan stood up and spoke very animated and forcefully. Surkhang was sitting there on the platform in line. He was pretending that he was falling asleep. At this time, I was a government official so I was looking at Surkhang to see how he was reacting, and I saw that he was acting like he was asleep and not paying any attention. After Tan Guansan spoke, then Surkhang gave a speech. He didn't say harsh words and said, "We are doing things sincerely." Which implies that what Tan Guansan said was wrong. Then he said, "Regarding the Khambas, the Dalai Lama, the Regent and the Kashag did all kinds of things like giving them advice and sending people to tell them to stop and we are adhering to the Central Committee. But some people in between are stirring up trouble through instigations. Actually we didn't do like that at all. In the future we will try to mollify the anger of China and stop the Khamba's disturbance, and we will see this through to the end. As to whether the government is doing anything or not, in the future if you look carefully you will know." He spoke calmly and wasn't aggressive and didn't say bad things about China.

**Q:** Did Surkhang say "we asked the Central Committee many times to do something and to take action about the Khambas because they have many soldiers and we couldn't handle it, but they didn't take action." Actually, it was strange that the both the Central Committee and the Tibetan Government didn't do anything to [stop] the Khambas.

**A:** I don't recall. Surkhang gave a tactful response to Tan Guansan's charges saying that we are doing our best, but the Khambas didn't listen to us. He also said, "With regard to the Khambas, if we were to send soldiers to fight the Khambas we only have a small number of troops, so it would not be easy to do that. And, when we send people to talk with them, they don't listen. So we have no means to do anything about this. But we will still try to mollify the Central Committee's anger and stop the Khamba's disturbance. Anyways, we don't like to have bad things happen."

**Q:** What did people think about this?

**A:** Various things. Some thought Tan was right and some thought Surkhang was correct.

**Q:** Were people astonished by the overt criticism?

**A:** This was the first time that Tan Guansan had openly criticised them in a real fierce way. So people were startled and frightened. Everyone thought now things will not go well. It made a bad impression. In Tan's speech he said "if you continue to do as you do now, there will be bloodshed among the brotherly nationalities. You have to pull yourselves up from the edge of the abyss" [Tib. g.yang sa nas rta kha 'then dgos red]. This gave our listeners fear and the bad impression that all will not go well.

Surkhang mainly explained and talked for a long time saying that we sent lay and monk officials to them, and we also asked the deities and lamas for divination, and had lamas and monks performed the ritual to help the situation.

**Q:** Why didn't the People's Liberation Army attack the Khambas? If they sent 5,000 People's Liberation Army soldiers, they could have eliminated them in a month. What do you think?

**A:** The Central Committee was propagandizing that they had the policy of peaceful liberation and an Agreement and a gradual implementation of democratic reforms. But at this time, China said that the Tibetan Government was outwardly complying, but secretly violating this and they didn't put into action things although they talked pleasantly. So I thought that if they sent the People's Liberation Army, it would create a bad impression in the international arena, and the same in Tibet. China had said this was to be peaceful, so using military force was not appropriate. E.g., if two people fought, the one who punches first is considered bad. China had done so much publicity on the Agreement and peaceful liberation that it would have been difficult to go back and use force.

**Q:** Is there any evidence in books that you have seen that the Kashag were really helping the Khambas? I didn't see any proof, e.g., people confessing in the prison about this.

**A:** It seems as if there was a link/connection between the Kashag and the Khambas. For example, at the time the Khambas stole the guns from Shang Ganden Chönkor, I was the Namling Dzongpön. I was very afraid, although I was not [physically] there.

**Q:** Who was the monk official then?

**A:** My colleague was Zhol Champa Thubden [Tib. zhol byams pa thub bstan]. He was the younger brother of the woman nicknamed "kite" [Tib. bya 'phur lan par]. When I was the principal [Ch. xiao zhang] of the Shigatse Primary School, an order from government came telling me to serve as the Namling Dzongpön, and promoting me to the 5th rank [Tib. las tshan pa]. This was in 1958. In the past, there were two common-rank lay officials in Namling. Then, after the dzong came to be managed by the government, one lay official and one monk official of the 5th rank was sent to that dzong. This was the reform where all of the income from the dzong went to the government and officials got a salary. I got about 250 khe of barley as my salary.

They [the Khambas] took the guns just after I had taken control of the dzong [the raid was in August 1958]. When they actually took the guns I was in Lhasa. I had left an acting dzongpön there. When I first became the dzongpön there were 2 old nyerpa from whom I had to take the accounts of all the dzong items to make sure they were turned over to me properly. Among these, was the list of the weapons. In this list, the number of each gun and the bullets and the cannons were listed. But the weapons weren't in the dzong. The monks had them and the dzong didn't even see them.

**Q:** When did they leave the guns there?

**A:** The history of the guns is as follows. In the past when there was a danger of a war with Ma Bufang, soldiers were sent to guard the north [Tib. byang srung]. Later, the soldiers were brought back. At that time, their weapons were placed under the joint custodianship of the dzong and the monastery. This was shortly before the peaceful liberation.

**Q:** How many guns were there?

**A:** A little over 500. They were 303 English Carbines, and there were 4 Howitzer cannons and many bullets. Among the government weapons, those at Namling were the better ones. So when I took over I got the list, but not the guns. One of the nyerpa I was doing the take over with was called Pandenla [Tib. dpal ldan lags]. He was also the monastery's tsodrag and he substituted for the old dzongpön to hand over the things to us. When we were taking a break from the take over, I went to urinate and I asked him where the guns were now. He said there were probably behind the assembly hall in the monastery. Since he didn't answer clearly, I didn't push and ask exactly where they were. I did ask if all the weapons are there and he said yes. There was a seal on each of the doors of the rooms in which they were stored. Really I should have been shown the seals, etc., but they didn't show me. We were just said to be the dzong heads, but Shang Gaden Chöñkor was very powerful in that area and they had close relations with the higher officials of the government. It seemed to me that because I had been a teacher for the CCP since 1953, they had doubts about me. So I didn't dare to push the issue with him. When I asked him where it was stored, he didn't tell me the place. So I had to keep quiet.

When the Khambas took out the guns there were no arguments or fights. The monastic officials said that the Khambas called the Nyertsang, etc. and 5-6 monastic officials at night and they were put in the Khambas tents pitched on the threshing ground. While they were held in the tent, the Khambas took out the weapons and we were surrounded by the Khambas holding guns and we couldn't make a move. This is what they said after 1959 in their confessions after the reforms. In reality, the monastery had a lot of monks and the Khambas couldn't have so easily taken out the guns. Later the Namling miser said that they saw that the monks were helping the Khambas to carry out the guns [laughter].

**Q:** Tashi Tsering: I also heard that many monks went with the Khambas.

**A:** Yes. Many of the young monks were determined to go and went when the Khambas left.

**Q:** How many monks were there in Shang Gaden Chöñkor?

**A:** 600-700.

**Q:** Later, when the revolt took place in Nagtsang, I heard that there were Gaden Chöñkor monks there.

**A:** Tashi Tsering: They would go to Nagtsang, because it was said to be the place where the monks would go to perform rituals and get donations [Tib. dkor sa dge khungs].

**A:** Before the Khambas took the guns, I was in Lhasa and I heard a rumor that they were going to the north and some said that they were going to take out the guns in Gaden Chöñkor so I was nervous and I reported this to the Kashag via the Gadrung. I said, "There is a real danger of losing the guns and the Kashag should do something to protect the guns. We cannot bear the responsibility of this. I was the Namling Dzongpön and the list was in the dzong, but I didn't know where the guns were. I thought that if I didn't report this to the Kashag, then later if the guns were taken, the blame would fall on my head. But they didn't do much of anything about this. So based on this incident, I think that it is clear that the Kashag was helping the Khambas.

**Q:** I doubt whether the Kashag itself had helped them. I heard it was Phala Drönyerchemmo and Namseling had told the Khambas about this.

**A:** At this time, Phala and Namseling were the people who actually had the connection with the Khambas. This was very obvious. I have never heard that the Kashag itself came out openly. Namseling was a Tsipön and he was kind of generic and Phala was the most important official working for the Dalai Lama. At this time, the Dalai Lama was said to have taken the political power, but he was young and whatever issue came up he would go to Phala like he was his teacher for advice, etc. and he had to yield [Tib. 'dzems] to him. For example, the Kashag was higher rank [than Phala], but they were all very frightened of Phala. So the real power in the Tibetan government was really in the hands of Phala, This was known to everyone.

**Q:** How was the power of the Jigyab Khembo?

**A:** Phala was more powerful than the Jigyab Khembo, although it should really have been the other way around and he should be close to the Dalai Lama. The Jigyab Khembo at that time was Gadrang. However, the Dalai Lama and Phala had a relationship going back years when the Dalai Lama was a child and they were very close. Gadrang, however, was new, so his relations with the Dalai Lama were not well establish and deep, so that is why Phala had more real power.

When the Dalai Lama came back from China, and when the Dalai Lama was about 14-15 [1949-50], the Jigyab Khembo was Lobsang Thöndrub [Tib. blo bzang don grub]. He was the one who lived in Shöl Khenpotsang [Tib. zhol mkhan po tshang]. After he died, then the Dalai Lama's personal attendant in charge of clothes (Tib. Simpön Khembo Khyenrabla [Tib. gzim dpon mkhan po mkhyen rab lags]) was appointed. He was one of those in the group that had gone to search for the Dalai Lama. He had been with the Dalai Lama for many years, but Gadrang was new. In 1957-58 Khyenrabla died and then Gadrang was appointed [Note: This is wrong. The Dalai Lama's brother Lobsang Samdenla was Jigyab Khembo in the '50s until 1956]. Phala would order Gadrang around.

**Q:** I heard that Namseling and Phala were brothers from the same parents.

**A:** No. His [Namseling's] mother probably was a daughter of Phala's family. She was a full sister of Phala's father.

**Q:** Was Tashi Perala [Tib. bkra shis dpal rab lags] also a relative of Phala?

**A:** No. He was the Trapchi Depön and from among the depöns he was one of the most famous. The Gusung and Trapchi Depön had more status than the other depön in Tibet. They sat above the tsipön [in ceremonies]. The other depön sat below the tsipön. So the government would think very carefully before appointing these two depön since they want to find people who are very reliable. The Gusung Regiment is responsible for protecting the Dalai Lama. The trapchi is responsible for defending Lhasa. Tashi Perala was Kalön Bönshö's [Tib. bon shod] younger brother and Tsesum Phünkang [Tib. tshes gsum phun khang] was also one of the three brothers. Tashi Pera was the younger of 3 sons. There were also daughters. Bönshö Phogpön [Tib. phogs dpon] was the son of the Bönshö Sawang but he was older than Tashi Pera.

**Q:** Was the Shigatse meeting before the guns were taken?

**A:** Yes. It was before. It was in the early part of 1958. The guns were taken in the Fall of 1958 and the meeting was in the early part of the year. I think it was in the 8th Tibetan month [September].

**Q:** Then there was the Lhasa Tsongdu hragdu gyepa that was called "to mollify zhongyang and end the Khamba's disturbance. Were you there?

**A:** No. I was in Shigatse working as a teacher. In any case, the custom for such meetings was that dzongpön were not called to attend - only those in Lhasa. So the people living outside, don't know what these meetings were about.

**Q:** I heard that the meeting decided to oppose the Chinese - what did you hear about this?

**A:** I heard that the meeting said that they do not want to send Tibetan soldiers to put down the Khambas. If we send soldiers there we don't know whether they will shoot the Khambas or turn around and shoot the People's Liberation Army. The Tibetan army is from all sorts of undisciplined people so if we send them and they turn around and join the Khambas and make war with the Chinese, then the situation will only get worse.

**Q:** The Trapchi Depön Tashi Pera didn't like the Chinese so if the Dalai Lama got a new depön and then told the troops to fight the Khambas, wouldn't that have worked?

**A:** The Dalai Lama is a gelong, so he doesn't get involved in war and soldiers. These kinds of things that involve acts of violence and killing are the responsibility of the Kashag. So the Dalai Lama never made decisions about executions, and mutilations. These decisions weren't even submitted to the Dalai Lama for approval. For example, Lungshar's mutilation was not authorized by Reting, but by the Silön Langdün [Tib. glang mdun]. And even if the Dalai Lama had ordered the troops to do that, it isn't certain all would have done it.

**Q:** Tashi Tsering: At this time, most people didn't like the Chinese. That is really true from my experience. I think it wouldn't have been possible for Tibetan troops to attack the Khambas and fire on them. I personally do not think any Tibetan soldiers would have fired on the Khambas even if they were sent.

**Q:** If these were U.S. troops, if they didn't obey orders, we would shoot them. It is like that with the People's Liberation Army.

**A:** Oh, our troops were not like that. The Tibetan soldiers were sent as a tax. The people who were sent were those who didn't like to work and didn't want to do farming, etc. So these were a motley crew. They weren't from good backgrounds. It was a tax, so they were really there just passing the time (i.e. they were not motivated).

**Q:** Your relative was in Labrang. At the time of the 17-Point Agreement there was a dispute over the territories up and below the Gampala [Tib. gam pa la] Pass? Did Labrang think they were a government or what?

**A:** At this time, after the 17-Point Agreement was agreed on, the dispute between the local (Tibetan) government and the labrang arose. They decided to write in the Agreement that the powers of the two would be like the powers of the 13th Dalai Lama and the 9th Panchen Lama when they were friendly. This would be put in the Agreement temporarily and later after they arrived in Lhasa, these would be finalized. So in Lhasa there were many meetings between the delegates of the Nangmagang and the drungtsi of the (Tibetan) government, and they argued. The contradiction between the Shung and Labrang was very severe and it was not a new thing from this generation. It was already 3 generations old.

**Q:** At the time of the Agreement, it seems to me that the Nangmagang wanted all of the territory south of the Gampala Pass.

**A:** Yes, that's right. Earlier, a Chinese Emperor said that all of the territory south of Gampala belongs to the Panchen Lama. This was Panchen Lobsang Yeshe [Tib. blo bzang ye shes] and the Dalai Lama Kestab Gyatso [Tib. skal bzang rgya mtsho] during the 7th the Dalai Lama's time. At this time, the Manchu Emperor had said that. There was a saying that the area in front of [north of] Gampala is Front Tibet [Ch. qian zang] in Chinese, and that is the realm of the Dalai Lama. And Back Tibet [Ch. hou zang] is the realm of the Panchen Lama which is the area south of or in the back of Gampala. However, Lobsang Yeshe didn't accept the Emperor's order. He said I don't want this. What I have now is fine. He said that the owner of Tibet is the Dalai Lama. So at this time the Emperor gave the Panchen Lama the three dzongs called "Lhangam Phunsum" [Tib. lha ngam phun gsum]. [Note: Lhatse, Ngamring and Phüntsoling [Tib. phun tshogs gling]]. This was during the reign of Emperor Kangxi. Panchen Lobsang Yeshe lived at the same time as 5th the Dalai Lama.

At first, the plan was to give the border dzongs, Nyakyi Rongsum [Tib. gnya' skyid rong gsum] [Note: Nyalam, Kyirong and Rongshar], but the Panchen Lama said these are too far away and I can't handle them and he didn't want them. Then they gave him the [above mentioned] 3 dzong near Shigatse. At this time, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama were equals in terms of

religion. One was the Lama and one was the disciple. The older was the lama and the younger was disciple. So the Nangmagang's delegate in Beijing probably did say their territory was everything south of Gampala. The Nangmagang's [main] delegate was Lhamön Yeshe Tsütrim. At this time, the officers of the United Front Ministry discussed this as middleman and they worked out the compromise, but both sides weren't satisfied and happy. What I heard regarding the Nangmagang's feeling was that, "We have worked totally for the benefit of the CCP, so we should have gotten more than that, but now from this decision we didn't get much. Whereas the Tibetan government thought the decision wasn't fair and the Chinese supported the Nangmagang and were trying to give the Dalai Lama's power to Labrang as much as they could. So they were also unhappy with the decision.

Then they had a discussion to settle this in Lhasa and they affixed a seal. I'm not sure where they affixed the seals. I think probably they put on seals in Beijing in 1954 when both of them went to Beijing and met Chairman Mao.

**Q:** At this time, Fan Ming was supporting the Panchen Lama. Then Li Weihsan sent Ya Hanzhang to Tibet to do research on the relationship [between the two lamas], and Mao Zedong approved that the Dalai Lama is the main one and the Panchen Lama is the second [Tib. phal pa]. Is this true?

**A:** I think that between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, if you look at history, there was no equality in political power, only in religious stature. In religion we say, the master and the disciple, Gyalba yabsey [Tib. rgyal ba yab sras]. The dispute over the power of the Panchen Lama was an old one. This was also in the time of the 13th and 9th. What each of them themselves thought, it is hard to say, but those under them felt this way.

**Q:** So this was settled by the CCP after Ya Hanzhang's research?

**A:** At the time of Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region, according to the Central Committee, this was to be a substitute for the local (Tibetan) government which would rule the whole of Tibet with the Dalai Lama as the Truren [Ch. zhu ren]. So it was clear that the CCP accepted the Dalai Lama as the ruler of Tibet. The Panchen Lama was the Vice Trurin with Ngabö and others. And in China, the Dalai Lama was the Vice Chairman of the National People's Congress [Tib. mi dmangs 'thus mi tshogs chen gyi gzhon pa; Ch. wei yuan zhang] and the Panchen Lama was the Vice Chairman of the Political Consultative Conference [Tib. chab srid gros tshogs kyi gzhon pa; Ch. zhu xi]. And the 17-Point Agreement, there was no seal of the Nangmagang, only the Dalai Lama. And if a Nangmagang official said they wanted to put on their seal, the shung would have refused saying that Labrang was only one of the bigger labrang among many labrangs under the government. So we will talk separately. When we talk with the Central Committee, you can't interfere. So the Nangmagang was unable at the Agreement talks to get itself raised up and the Central Committee also wasn't able to pull them up.

**Q:** Tashi Tsering: At first, did Labrang have that kind of desire?

**A:** I don't know whether they had said internally or not. I have never heard that. Anyway, this was unacceptable. In the beginning, when the PRC was set up, the Panchen Lama sent a telegram saying that we will adhere to it and please liberate Tibet soon. And he was saying that he said that on behalf of Tibet and the Central Committee also had put this among the accomplishments of the 10th Panchen Lama. But later when they made the actual decision, they didn't accept his authority of the representative [of Tibet]. I heard that at the meetings Ngabö was surprised that the response of the two monk officials, Thubden Lengmön and Lhautara, was absolutely against Labrang. They said under no circumstances can we have Labrang have anything to do with the negotiations. The attitude of the 2 monk officials towards the internal Tibetan [labrang] issue was so fierce, but they were not fierce with the CCP. [laughter]

**Q:** Was Che Jigme able to get out from prison?

**A:** Probably he was released just before he died when there wasn't any hope to remain alive. I heard that he died near his younger wife Sonam Lhamo [Tib. bsod nams lha mo].

**Q:** Did you hear that Che Jigme was very regretful and he left his last will on his death bed saying that all the work I did was a mistake?

**A:** I absolutely didn't hear that.